On the Possibility of Strong Artificial Life

Li, Jianhui (2018) On the Possibility of Strong Artificial Life. Open Journal of Philosophy, 08 (05). pp. 495-505. ISSN 2163-9434

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Abstract

One of the central problems in philosophy of artificial life (AL) is whether the artificial life entities we create can be genuine life. Proponents of strong AL believe that the artificial life entities exhibiting characteristics of natural life in a physical or a virtual environment can be real life. Opponents of strong artificial life, however, think that artificial life entities are not real life or just simulation of natural life. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate which view of strong artificial life is valid. The method is to use philosophical theory and logics to analyze the opponents’ arguments. The conclusion is that the opponents’ arguments for denying strong AL are insufficient to exclude the possibility of strong AL.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: AP Academic Press > Social Sciences and Humanities
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email support@apacademicpress.com
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2023 04:41
Last Modified: 07 Jun 2024 10:00
URI: http://info.openarchivespress.com/id/eprint/1694

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